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ABSTRACT 
The Rational Expectations Hypothesis (REH) states that the actual outcome will be identical to the 
optimal forecast when all obtainable information had been utilized in forming the expectations. This 
study intends to empirically examine the existence of rational behavior in the banks and other financial 
institutions in Malaysia from the perspective of how the decision-makers formed their gross revenue 
(GR) and capital expenditure (CE) forecasts. Survey data provided by the Business Expectations Survey 
of Limited Companies was utilized to conduct a series of rationality tests including unbiasedness, non-
serially correlated and efficiency tests. Empirical evidence shows that GR is unbiased, serially 
uncorrelated and efficient, nevertheless, CE fails to pass any of the tests. Therefore, GR is deemed as a 
rational predictor to the actual value but not in the case of CE. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Rational expectations utilize all the available information and experimental data to 
predict the variables in a future market. As noted by Pesaran and Weale (2006), rational 
expectations are the composition of an economy structure and model through the economic 
theories determined by effects of expected future events on current behavior. In other words, 
an economy model can only be tested if the expectations data is rational. In a different way, 
Muth (1961) and Lucas (1972) suggested that the existence of rational expectations is valid 
with the condition that the expectations are formed when the market is under unique 
equilibrium. Besides, rational expectations play an important role in microeconomics and 
macroeconomics helping policies makers evade from persuading ineffective policies. The 
successful and efficiency decisions that avoid the uncertainty of the economy environment 
could be obtained merely through the rational expectations. Effective business management 
with full allocation of resources will subsequently maximize the business outcomes by 
adjusting the economic planning and policies. 
 
 The financial sector is one of the top contributors in the services sector that drastically 
affects the nation’s GDP. In Malaysia, financial systems are broadly divided into banking and 
non-bank financial institutions that account for approximately 70 percent and 30 percent, 
respectively (Sufian, 2006). The banking system is further divided into three main groups: 
commercial banks, finance companies and merchant banks. The non-bank financial 
institutions are partitioned into two major clusters: finance companies and merchant banks. 
An efficient financial sector can help to open up the country to a global market and enhance 
financial market liberalization. Moreover, it boosts the economy’s growth and development 
in the long-run. Nevertheless, the inefficiency in this sector in turn will be harmful to the 
economy. Therefore, this study attempts to investigate whether the predictions of decision-
makers in Malaysian banks and other financial institutions are aligned with the rational 
expectations hypothesis (REH). 
chpuah@feb.unimas.my 
2 
 
2.  BRIEF REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
Generally, REH can be tested by using direct tests and indirect tests of the survey 
data. Direct tests are the non-parametric tests that do not require prior models while the 
indirect tests are the joint tests that may be rejected due to incorrect model specification. In 
this study, the Malaysian quantitative survey-based expectations are utilized to determine the 
type of expectations formed in the banks and other financial institutions through the direct 
tests. This section comprises a brief discussion of the empirical works that employ different 
estimation techniques in testing REH. We noted that much effort has been devoted in testing 
REH, but there is only fair evidence that is in favor of it.  
 
In the past few decades, interest in studying the rational behavior of economic agents 
has greatly increased. By and large, traditional regression had been employed by using the 
OLS estimator to examine the rationality. In particular, the unbiasedness test, non-serial 
correlation test, efficiency test and orthogonality test have been widely utilized in this matter. 
Razzak (1997) claimed that the survey data that passed the unbiasedness, efficiency and 
orthogonality tests showed weakly rational, followed by the sufficiently rational that is 
obtained after passing the ARIMA models, and strictly rational after passing tests for strong 
rationality. On the other hand, some literatures started to test the REH by using the 
quantitative expectations converted from qualitative expectations. A further condition is for 
the forward looking and backward looking expectations to be addressed since they can 
change the expectations formation process. Recently, researchers tend to employ time series 
analyses which include stationarity and cointegration tests together with other diagnostic tests 
in studying the REH. In addition, there is also consideration of using panel data analysis to 
observe the realization and prediction effects in the REH studies. 
 
 The findings of expectations based on macroeconomics variables such as inflation 
overwhelmingly imply that REH is well applied. Other than inflation, REH also have been 
tested for income, price level, production growth rate, unemployment rate, wage rate, 
company profit, interest rate and commodity price. The empirical findings from the REH 
tests, however, have mixed results. For instance, the studies by Habibullah (1994a, 1997), 
Razzak (1997), Heinemann and Ullrich (2006), Mestre (2007), as well as Henzel and 
Wollmershäuser (2008) found evidence in support of REH.  In contrast, the works by 
Gerberding (2001), Ashiya (2003), Lehmann (2009) and Puah, Chong and Jais (2011) had 
rejected the REH.  
 
 
3.  THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
The REH is dictated by the mathematical expectations (predictions) to be the same as 
the subjective expectations (actualizations) as demonstrated by Muth (1961) and expressed 
below: 
}{ 1 tttt eE Ω=∀ −        (1)                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
 
where E is the proxy of the mathematical predictions operator, t-1et  is the predictions for 
observed value t∀  on time t that constituted at time t-1, and Ωt represents the information set 
at the time forecasts made.  
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As the economic agents tend to utilize all the available information without 
dissipation, the model is rewritten as: 
 
0}{ 1 =Ω−∀ − tttt eE        (2) 
 
Subsequently, it can be reconstructed by treating ћt as forecast errors t∀ -t-1et: 
 
0}{ =Ω ttE         (3) 
 
The forecasting errors ћt are assumed to be free from measurement errors due to the 
fact that economic agents will redress the past forecast errors during the anticipations 
assembly at time t-1. Additionally, ћt shall not correlate with any variables inside the 
information set as well. On the other hand, REH postulates that forecasting is required to be 
unbiased, non-serial correlated and efficient. Consequently, the REH is violated if any of the 
above properties are unable to be fulfilled. 
 
 
4.  EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
In this study, the realized and anticipated values of the operational variables in the 
banks and other financial institutions have been collected from various issues of the Business 
Expectations Survey of Limited Companies published by the Department of Statistics 
Malaysia. These operational variables include gross revenue (GR) and capital expenditure 
(CE) of the firms in the industry. The sample period spans from June 1991 to June 2006 with 
survey data on bi-annually basis. 
 
Clayton (1997) and Lim and McKenzie (1998) pointed out that non-stationary data 
tends to cause rejection of REH and lead to spurious results for rationality tests. Thus, the 
stationarity properties of the time series need to be ascertained beforehand through unit root 
testing. In Table 1, the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit root test results indicated that 
both realized and anticipated values of GR and CE are non-stationary at level, but they 
appeared to be stationary after the first order differencing. Thus, the time series for GR and 
CE are said to be integrated of order one, or I(1). This indicates that the data under study is 
appropriate for rationality tests. 
 
Table 1: Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test Results 
 Realized Variables Anticipated Variables 
 Level 
GR -2.326 (0) -2.396(0) 
CE -3.462(3) -3.344(3) 
 First Difference 
∆GR -8.674(0)*** -8.364(0)*** 
∆CE -4.678(3)*** -4.420(3)*** 
Notes: The model allows a trend and intercept for level while intercepting for first difference. Asterisk (***) indicates 
statistically significant at 1% level. Figures in parentheses are the lag lengths. The ADF test examines the null hypothesis 
of a unit root against the stationary alternative. Critical values for ADF test are obtained from MacKinnon (1996) as 
follow: (1%) -4.30 and (5%) -3.57. 
 
REH requires subjective expectations to be identical to the corresponding 
mathematical expectations (Friedman, 1980). Accordingly, the realizations are regressed by 
survey expectations via the unbiasedness test shown as: 
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tttt e εβα ++= −∀ 1        (4) 
 
where εt  is a zero mean finite-variance disturbance term that is uncorrelated with t-1et. The 
rejection of the null hypothesis, H0: α=0, β=1 implies that anticipations are the biased 
predictor of the actual outcomes. Instead, the cointegration test has some meaningful 
implications in testing REH, particularly on establishing the long-run relationship between 
the realized and anticipated series. It is used to further evaluate the unbiasedness after the unit 
root test (Schirm, 2003). If the series are cointegrated, forecast errors had not followed the 
random walk and fit the judgment of rationality. Therefore, the study proceeds with the 
unbiasedness test, Engle-Granger cointegration test, and LM test after verifying that all 
variables are integrated with the same order. 
 
Table 2 presents the results of the Engle-Granger cointegration test symbolized by the 
ADF statistic. The cointegration test result indicated that there is a long running co-
movement between the expected and actual values for GR and CE. Moreover, the F-statistic 
of the joint hypothesis that imposed restriction for α=0 and β=1 in the unbiasedness test 
suggested that the forecast is an unbiased predictor of the actual value for GR, since the null 
hypothesis cannot be rejected at the 5 percent level. Nonetheless, it can be rejected for the 
case of CE at the 1 percent level. In other words, predictions based on GE are unbiased, but it 
is not the same case in CE. Other than that, the significant slope of both GR and CE implies 
that firms in the financial industry are able to predict the future outcomes well. In addition, 
the LM test results showed that the disturbance term for GR is white noise. 
 
Table 2: Results of Engle-Granger Cointegration Test, Unbiasedness Test and LM Test  
 GR CE 
Cointegration Test   
ADF -5.753*** -3.946*** 
   
Unbiasedness Test   
Constant (α) 0.190 0.149 
Slope (β) 0.980*** 0.917*** 
F-statistic (α=0, β=1) 0.853 18.922*** 
LM(2) 1.371 3.203** 
Notes: Critical value for ADF is -2.65 (1%), -1.95(5%) and -1.61(10%) (see MacKinnon, 1996). Asterisks (***) and (**) 
denote statistically significant at 1% and 5% levels, respectively. 
 
The existence of serial correlation between forecast errors and the lag forecast errors 
is tested by employing the non-serial correlation test as follows: 
 
0}{ =−ittE   ; i = {1, 2, 3,...,n}     (5) 
 
The forecast errors ћt will be adjusted from time to time as suggested by REH.  
Consequently, the past forecast errors ћt-1 should not exhibit any relationship with ћt. 
Meanwhile, the efficiency test is used to examine if the forecast errors are disjointed with any 
variables comprised in the information set available during forecasting (Beach, Fernandez-
Cornejo and Uri, 1995). The equation is expressed as below:  
 
0}{ =Ω −ittE         (6)  
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In Table 3, the results of non-serial correlation and weak-form efficiency tests on the 
GR consistently suggest that the hypotheses of serially uncorrelated and efficiency cannot be 
rejected, however, these outcomes do not apply to CE. Consequently, the forecast on CE is 
serially correlated and inefficient (see Table 3). This implies that the decision-makers in the 
financial sector have incorporated all the available information when building expectations 
on GR, but it was the other way around for CE. All in all, GR is a rational predictor to the 
actual value. 
 
Table 3: Results of Non-Serial Correlation and Weak-Form Efficiency Tests 
Variable 
F-statistic with respect to lag length 
1 2 3 
NSC WF NSC WF NSC WF 
GR 1.357 0.529 0.962 0.887 0.405 0.467 
CE 18.800*** 25.842*** 16.514*** 16.621*** 11.795*** 12.257*** 
Notes: NSC refers to non-serial correlation test while WF refers to weak-form efficiency test. Asterisk (***) denote 
statistically significant at 1% level. 
 
 
5.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
Business survey expectations entail significant consequences not only for the 
respondent firms, but also for the individuals and government that are directly affected by the 
economic environment. In this study, the rationality of Malaysian banks and others financial 
institutions was examined using the actual and expected operational variables in the industry. 
Using the techniques of unit root, cointegration, unbiasedness, non-serial correlation as well 
as efficiency tests, the results demonstrated that firms are rational predictors of future 
outcomes in the case of GR. However, they do not seem to follow the REH in predicting CE. 
In another view, survey respondents do not incorporate all the available information in 
forecasting the CE rather than GR. This finding is consistent with Habibullah (1994b) along 
with Wong, Puah and Shazali (2011) who found that expectations based on CE are more 
likely to reject the rationality tests compared to GR. 
 
Furthermore, the estimated coefficient (β<1) illustrated that the Malaysian banks tend 
to overestimate when making predictions based on CE (Aggarwal and Mohanty, 2000). 
Perhaps, this is due to the nature of the industry as the financial sector is one of the most 
fluctuated industries. Therefore, decision-makers are hardly able to predict the CE rationally. 
In addition, the predictions of CE in the financial sector are easily affected by the market 
forces. To summarize, although REH does not hold for the expectations based on CE, it fixed 
well for the GR predictions in that particular sector. This might imply that Malaysian banks 
and others financial institutions are alert to the economy changing the GR and they are 
capable of adjusting their expectations from time to time by avoiding past errors. 
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